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Abstract: 
According to numerous studies, the election-year economy influences presidential election 
results far more than cumulative growth throughout the term. Here we describe a series of 
surveys and experiments that point to an intriguing explanation for voter behavior that runs 
contrary to the standard explanations political science has offered, but one that accords with a 
large psychological literature. Voters, we find, actually intend to judge presidents on cumulative 
growth. However, since that characteristic is not readily available to them, voters inadvertently 
substitute election-year performance because it is more easily accessible. This “end-heuristic” 
explanation for voters’ election-year emphasis reflects a general tendency for people to simplify 
retrospective assessments by substituting conditions at the end for the whole. The end heuristic 
explanation also suggests a remedy, a way to align voters’ actions with their intentions. 
Providing people with the attribute they are seeking—cumulative growth—eliminates the 
election-year emphasis.  
 
  
                                                 
*
 E-mail: ahealy@lmu.edu 
**
 Corresponding author, e-mail: glenz@berkeley.edu 
We thank Larry Bartels, Adam Berinsky, Eitan Hersh, Justin Fox, Jens Hainmueller, Paco 
Flores-Macias, Aaron Kaufman, Neil Malhotra, Mike Myers, Leif Nelson, Michael Peress, Kai 
Quek, Ken Shepsle, and Joe Simmons for helpful comments and suggestions, as well as seminar 
participants at Brown University, MIT, Princeton University, UC Berkeley, UC Merced, 
University of Rochester, and Yale University. 
 1 
Voters, the data suggest, reward incumbents not broadly for economic growth throughout 
incumbents' terms, but narrowly for conditions in the six months or year before Election Day 
(e.g., Kramer 1971; Fair 1978; Kiewiet 1983; Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal 1993; Achen 
and Bartels 2004). Surveying the evidence, Achen and Bartels (2004) conclude that “long-term 
economic growth, whether in real income or GDP, contributes little or nothing to the incumbent 
party’s electoral prospects.” In this article, we seek to understand this behavior, which creates at 
least three major problems for democratic accountability. 
First, voter behavior incentivizes politicians to also focus on election-year growth, with 
substantial consequences for public welfare. As Tufte (1978) wrote, it creates “a bias towards 
policies with immediate, highly visible benefits and deferred, hidden costs—myopic policies for 
myopic voters” (143). In perhaps the clearest U.S. example, the Nixon administration pressured 
Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns to pursue expansionary monetary policy in late 1971 
and early 1972, which helped precipitate high inflation in the years that followed (Greider 1989; 
Abrams 2006). Second, the election-year focus can lead to adverse selection. Instead of selecting 
the best economic leaders, democracies may select the best economic manipulators. Finally, the 
election-year focus may make voters less likely to select the best leaders simply by introducing 
noise, turning democracy into a game of “musical chairs” where elections are determined not so 
much by the quality of the candidates, but by the vagaries of the business cycle (Achen and 
Bartels 2004). Bartels (2008, 110) finds that if voters focused more on the overall economy 
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during presidents’ terms, they would have elected a different president in three postwar elections 
(1952, 1968, and 2000).
1
 
So why do voters, who presumably would like to maximize economic welfare and elect 
capable leaders, respond primarily to the election-year economy? More generally, why do 
recency effects emerge not just with the economy, but also in domains such as legislative 
appropriations, crime, and terrorist attacks?
2
 To test the potential explanations, we consider 
evidence from a series of surveys and experiments.  
We first attempt to answer a fundamental but unaddressed question relevant to all 
explanations: what are voters’ intentions? Across a wide variety of elicitation methods, we find 
that voters intend to weigh the years of a president’s term similarly. To determine why voters 
place much greater weight on the election-year economy despite their intentions to do otherwise, 
we conduct studies where we show participants economic conditions during presidents’ terms. 
After viewing simple plots of either historical or hypothetical yearly personal income growth 
during each term, participants evaluate overall economic conditions. We then examine how 
much influence (weight) each year has on their evaluations. Even though participants observe 
                                                 
1
 Voters’ election-year emphasis can also affect the entry decisions of challengers, who face 
greater uncertainty due to the unknown election-year economy. The election-year emphasis may 
also limit incentives to pursue strong growth earlier in a term if mean-reversion in growth early 
on makes robust growth in the election year easier to achieve.  
2
 For example, see Shepsle et al. (2009, 357), Muthoo and Shepsle (2010), and Levitt (1996). 
Several studies also find evidence of recency effects, and the perverse incentives they create, 
with terrorist attacks (Bali 2007; Aksoy 2011; Montalvo 2011). 
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growth for all four years, their behavior closely resembles actual voter behavior. That is, despite 
intending to weigh income growth in all years roughly equally, they nevertheless overweigh the 
last year.  
We first use these studies to test two standard explanations for why voters overweigh the 
end: that voters either simply fail to remember earlier conditions (e.g., Sarafidis 2007) or that 
they perceive the election year as more informative (e.g., Mackuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992). 
Instead of supporting these explanations, however, our findings point to an intriguing alternative, 
which we call the “end heuristic” explanation. While this explanation deviates from the standard 




According to this explanation, voters intend to judge presidents on overall performance 
rather than election-year conditions, but overall performance during the term is not readily 
available to them. Even if some candidates, such as Obama in the current election, attempt to 
focus on the long term, the media focus mainly on recent economic conditions.
4
 More generally, 
                                                 
3
 While the end heuristic explanation has not been tested as an explanation for myopic economic 
voting, Bechtel and Hainmueller (2011) argue that usage of a “peak-and-end” heuristic can help 
to explain why German voters rewarded robust disaster response. In addition, a growing political 
science literature has considered how other heuristics affect voters (e.g., Kuklinski and Quirk 
2000; Berry and Howell 2007; Oliver and Ha 2007; Duch and Stevenson 2008; Duch and Tyran 
2012).  
4
 We classified a random sample of broadcast media transcripts covering the US economy in the 
months preceding the 2000, 2004, and 2008 presidential elections according to the time period 
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it takes cognitive effort to discern total performance over the term. With total performance not 
readily available, voters do what decision makers have been shown to do in many other 
environments where retrospective assessments are involved: they simplify a complicated 
evaluation problem by substituting end conditions for overall conditions (Varey and Kahneman 
1992; Redelmeier and Kahneman 1996; Ariely and Carmon 2000). As Kahneman (2011) 
recently put it, “people who face a difficult question often answer an easier one instead, without 
realizing it” (Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Kahneman 2003). We argue that voters are doing 
something similar when confronted with the cognitively difficult task of summing conditions 
over an extended period, precisely the kind of situation where psychologists have found that 
people tend to rely on the end to represent the whole. Despite trying to evaluate overall 
performance over a term, our subjects appear to focus on the election-year economy because that 
attribute is an easily available substitute for the overall growth for which they are searching. 
We then use a variation on our experimental design to directly test the end heuristic 
explanation. If voters are indeed accidentally substituting election-year growth for cumulative 
growth, then curing this tendency—that is, helping them apply the weights they intend to 
apply—should be straightforward. As suggested by research in psychology (e.g., Liersch and 
McKenzie 1992), we should only have to make cumulative growth equally available. We find 
precisely this pattern. When we provide participants information on cumulative performance 
(e.g., total income growth during incumbents’ terms or income in levels), they no longer focus 
                                                                                                                                                             
they covered. 96% of those articles covered economic conditions in the year preceding the 
election, with much less covering earlier conditions. Please see the supporting information (SI) 
for complete details. 
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on the election year. Instead, they weigh all years roughly equally. Thus, while our results 
provide evidence of voters failing to act the way they intend with important implications for 
democratic accountability, they also point to a potential remedy for recency effects that 
government statistical agencies, the news media, and candidates could adopt. 
Why the election-year economy? Three explanations 
Political scientists have considered a variety of explanations for the weight voters place 
on the election-year economy. An obvious explanation pertains to memory. Compared to their 
memories of a year ago, voters’ memories of economic conditions in earlier years of the term 
may be faint or inaccurate (e.g., Sarafidis 2007). Even if they intend to answer Reagan's question 
(“Are you better off than you were four years ago?”), they may not be able to simply because 
they lack the necessary information about earlier economic conditions. 
A second explanation is that voters may see the election-year economy as more 
informative about the quality of the president's economic stewardship. They may view the 
president’s policies as taking months or years to influence the economy. Therefore, they may 
perceive economic performance at the end as particularly revealing about the effectiveness of 
those policies and so more predictive of future growth under that incumbent (e.g., Mackuen, 
Erikson, and Stimson 1992; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2000; Erikson, MacKuen, and 
Stimson 2002).  
A third explanation, which has received considerably less attention from political 
scientists, stems from research in psychology. Psychologists have documented a pervasive 
human tendency to substitute the end for the whole when retrospectively assessing experiences. 
More recent work concludes that this behavior reflects an even more general tendency to 
substitute one attribute for another without realizing it, a tendency that Daniel Kahneman calls 
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“attribute substitution” (Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Kahneman 2003). When people attempt 
to judge a target attribute, such as the change in their welfare under an incumbent president, they 
search for a reasonable value. For some judgments, this search finishes almost immediately 
because the required value is readily accessible (e.g., the question “How old are you?”). For 
many judgments, however, the target attribute does not readily come to mind, but the search for 
it evokes related attributes. People then substitute the related attribute for the target attribute, 
without realizing it. Regarding the economy, even if voters have a general idea of economic 
conditions in previous years (i.e., memory is not a problem), putting all the information together 
requires cognitive effort. As a result, voters may simplify the problem they intended to address 
(“How well did the economy perform during the president’s term?”) by substituting with an 
answer to a related question (“How has the economy been recently?”).  
Not only is attribute substitution pervasive, but it appears to be particularly common with 
retrospective assessments like those involved with evaluating economic performance during a 
presidential term. These assessments are examples of what Kahneman (2002) calls extensional 
attributes, defined as aggregated properties of the evaluation targets such as those that involve 
summing over a period of time. Since these attributes are generally not readily available to 
individuals—they require calculations—people are especially prone to substituting other 
attributes such as the end. Indeed, people seem to evaluate entire experiences from colonoscopies 
to shopping according to the conditions at the peak and at the end, a phenomenon sometimes 
referred to as a “Peak-End Rule” (e.g., Redelmeier and Kahneman 1996; Fredrickson and 
Kahneman 1993). The peak part of the rule has figured less prominently in subsequent research 
than in the early studies of colonoscopies and aversive sounds—possibly because peak pain or 
discomfort is more salient—suggesting that the end part of the rule is more robust to other 
environments (e.g., Ariely 1998). 
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A series of experiments conducted by Kahneman et al. (1993) provides an example of 
this research. Participants began the studies by immersing one hand in very cold water for ten 
seconds. The researchers then told participants to expect three more trials of this kind, but 
actually conducted only two. In the Short trial, participants kept one hand in water at 14°C for 60 
seconds. In the Long trial, the immersion lasted 90 seconds. The experimenters kept the water at 
14°C for the first 60 seconds, at which point they gradually raised the temperature from 14°C to 
15°C over the next 30 seconds (unbeknownst to the participants). After a seven minute delay, the 
researchers called participants for a third trial, informed them that they would repeat one of the 
two previous procedures, gave them a choice of whether the first or the second trial should be 
repeated, and asked them to answer several questions about the first two trials.  
The results were striking. Even though participants experienced more total pain in the 
Long trial, a large majority preferred to repeat it. The slight decrease in pain in the last 30 
seconds of the Long trial led participants to remember the entire trial as less painful than it 
actually was—they judged the experience on the end rather than the whole. A similar 
phenomenon occurs in many kinds of retrospective evaluations, including vacations 
(Loewenstein and Prelec 1993), emotional episodes (Varey and Kahneman 1992; Fredrickson 
and Kahneman 1993), TV advertisements (Baumgartner, Sujan, and Padgett 1997), gambling 
(Ross and Simonson 1991), and academic performance (Zauberman, Diehl, and Ariely 2006).  
These studies are also consistent with the finding from the retrospective voting literature 
that voters appear to vote as pocketbook voters on their own economic experiences (Kramer 
1983; Lewis-Beck 1985), and as sociotropic observers of the national economy (Kinder and 
Kiewiet 1981). In the psychological studies, individuals appear to apply the end heuristic not 
only when they evaluate their own experiences, but also when they evaluate the experiences of 
others. In their study of colonoscopy patients, for example, Redelmeier and Kahneman (1996) 
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found an end heuristic explained not only patients’ evaluations of their colonoscopy experiences, 
but also the administering physicians’ estimates of the pain that their patients experienced. 
Moreover, when asked which patients should have received more anesthetic, the doctors 
answered not according to total pain, but on pain at the peak and the end. Studies have found 
similar end bias when participants evaluated data on people's discomfort with unpleasant 
experiences, such as listening to loud drilling noises (Varey and Kahneman 1992), when 
participants evaluated data on factories’ production of defective products (reject rate), and when 
they evaluated tests of other individuals’ intelligence (Zauberman, Diehl, and Ariely 2006). In 
short, observers appear to apply (or misapply) the same end heuristic in retrospective evaluations 
as those undergoing the experiences. They both substitute the end when evaluating the whole. 
Summarizing the Surveys and Experiments 
 As described earlier, we use a series of surveys and experiments to disentangle competing 
explanations for why sociotropic voters put so much weight on the election-year economy. Table 
1 presents a list of the studies that we present in the paper. We also conducted more than a dozen 
additional studies that replicate and extend these findings; we present these in the Supporting 
Information (SI). In the results that follow, we refer to these studies by letter. When presenting 
regression results and summary statistics in the tables that follow, we include the study identifier 
so that readers can easily trace results back to the sample that generated them by referring to 
Table 1. 
Voters’ Actual and Intended Behavior 
Before examining the underlying reasons, we describe the extent to which voters assign 
extra weight to the election-year economy. Many studies have documented that voters’ decisions 
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depend on election-year growth rather than cumulative growth during the entire term (e.g., 
Kramer 1971; Fair 1978; Kiewiet 1983; Achen and Bartels 2004). Figure 1 illustrates this 
pattern, showing the relationship between the incumbent party’s vote margin and election-year 
income growth. The relationship is strikingly strong—when incumbents preside over robust 
election-year growth, they win in landslides, such as in 1964 and 1984. Similar graphs for 
growth in earlier years of a president’s term evince no such relationship. 
In Table 2, we show the estimated weights that actual voters assigned to economic 
growth in each year of presidential terms, using data from 1944 to 2008. We obtain these 
estimates by regressing the incumbent party’s vote share margin on real disposable income 
(RDI) growth in each of the previous four years (see Column 1). Consistent with previous work 
(e.g., Bartels 2008), each percentage point of election-year income growth increases the 
incumbent party’s expected margin by just over four percentage points (b = 4.37, p < 0.01). In 
contrast, third-year growth has a much smaller effect (b = 1.48), which is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. First and second year growth have point estimates that are 
close to zero. Converting those coefficients to relative weights suggests that voters put 75% of 
the weight on election-year growth, 25% of the weight on third-year growth, and no weight on 
first-year or second-year growth (see Column 2).  
To understand this election-year focus, a fundamental first question is whether this 
behavior is intentional. Do voters mean to put so much weight on the election year? Several 
explanations suggest that it is intentional. For example, voters may consciously choose to assign 
extra weight to the election-year economy if they believe it provides more information than 
earlier conditions about incumbent performance and potential future growth under that 
incumbent (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002). 
 10 
Our survey responses suggest, however, that voters' behavior may not be intentional. In a 
nationally representative internet survey fielded by Survey Sampling International in May 2010 
(Study A1),
5
 1602 survey respondents answered the following question: “When evaluating the 
economy during presidents' terms, how much weight do you typically give to each year? (Please 
enter a percent for each year, with the total equaling 100%.)” The answers were constrained to 
sum to 100%. We summarize respondents’ intended weights in the third column of Table 2. 
Although voters actually place weight of 0%, 0%, 25%, and 75% on years 1-4, respectively, the 
average intended weights in our survey display a different pattern. On average, respondents 
reported that they intended to use weights of 20.6%, 22.9%, 27.0%, and 29.6% for years one 
through four of a president’s term.
6
  
Of course, these results are only suggestive.
7
 Not only are they from a single question 
from a single sample, but aspects of the question may have led participants to weigh the years 
equally. In particular, since participants' weights must add up to 100, a quick solution is 25% for 
each year. At the same time, answering 0%, 0%, 0%, 100% is also an easy solution—one that 
                                                 
5
 SSI administered the survey between May 17 and May 19, 2010. We did not employ quotas but 
asked SSI to construct a target population that matched the (18 and over) census population on 
education, gender, age, geography, and income. Although the resulting sample is not a 
probability sample, it is a representative national sample on these demographics. 
6
 We also elicited intended weights from our participants after they completed the experiments 
we describe below, and those weights display a very similar pattern (see p. 4 of the SI).  
7
 In particular, studies have shown that people have difficulties self-reporting on their own 
cognitive processes (Nisbett and Wilson 1977). 
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much more closely matches voters' actual behavior—but one only 20 of 1602 individuals 
provided.  
To investigate whether the structure of the question could have led to our findings, we 
conducted several additional studies, finding similar results. We present complete results for 
these robustness tests in the supporting information (SI). We tried eliminating the easy answer by 
requiring the weights to sum to 70% instead of 100% (see pp. 5-6). We also tried providing 
participants with predefined sets of weights to choose between, e.g., 0%, 0%, 25%, 75% or 20%, 
23%, 27%, 30% (see pp. 7-9).  
In case participants simply failed to understand the questions involving weights, we also 
tried eliciting their intentions without referring to weights. In Study A2, we asked 572 
participants how much their overall evaluation of a president's term would go up if growth 
improved in a given year (randomized to be either year 1, 2, 3, or 4). Participants’ response 
options ranged from “Does Not Change” to “Goes Up Substantially.” If individuals intended to 
place more weight on later years, their evaluations should increase least if presented with a year 
1 growth increase and most when presented with a year 4 growth increase. Using a between-
subjects design, we asked participants this hypothetical for only one of the four years: e.g., “by 
how much would your rating change if growth in Year 4 was three percentage points higher?” 
Since we only asked participants about a single year, they seem unlikely to be motivated by 
possible experimenter demand for equal weights. As with the other approaches, participants 
responded similarly to all four years (see pp. 10-11 in the SI). In sum, no matter how we elicited 
people’s intentions, we arrived at the same conclusion: people intend to weigh all years similarly 
with only slightly more weight on later years.  
 12 
Memory-based Explanations  
To investigate why voters disproportionately focus on the election-year economy despite 
no apparent intention to do so, we start by considering memory. Simply put, voters may lack 
memory of economic conditions in earlier years. Even if voters do not entirely forget earlier 
conditions, they may primarily put weight on the more recent conditions that they remember 
better. 
To investigate this explanation, we ran experiments where we showed participants 
information about the economy during presidents' terms. Our motivation was to remove memory 
constraints about economic performance. In the first experiment (Study B1), participants saw bar 
plots of income growth showing all four years of historical terms (1941-2008). We presented 
these plots without referring to the presidents who presided over each term. Figure 2 presents an 
example of these bar plots (see the SI for complete instructions). These 17 terms are the same 
ones we used in the regression to estimate the actual weights that real-world voters used (Table 
2).
8
 Below each plot, we asked, “How would you rate the condition of the national economy 
during this period? Is it very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad?” To put income growth 
and these evaluations on a similar scale, we recoded responses to vary from 0 to 10, with 10 
corresponding to “very good.” We take the average of the responses for each of the 17 terms and 
call this variable Economic Evaluations. 
For this study, we recruited 232 participants through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk web 
service, accepting only those with a 90% or better acceptance rate on previous work, and paying 
                                                 
8





 As we note in a later section, the main findings replicate in a nationally 
representative sample. Before analyzing the data, we dropped participants who failed to evaluate 
every term or who failed a test of attention to instructions (about 10% of the sample). We follow 
similar procedures for all the Mechanical Turk studies. 
Even when presented with data from all years in a simple format, respondents put 
substantially more weight on the economy in the final year of presidents' terms. To illustrate this 
behavior, consider the two examples in Figure 2. In the top panel, which shows Bill Clinton's 
first term, growth was only moderate on average, but ends on a relatively strong note. In the 
bottom panel, which shows Jimmy Carter's only term, cumulative growth was actually stronger 
than in Clinton's first term, but slows substantially by the election year. Even though cumulative 
income growth was higher during Carter's term (6.9% versus 6.2% in Clinton's), participants 
rated the economy during Clinton's first term as much stronger. On a 10-point scale, they rated 
Clinton's as 6.2 on average and Carter's as only 3.9 (p < 0.001 for the two-tailed test of equality). 
Participants therefore appeared to focus more on the end, even though they could see all four 
years and even though we only asked them about the economy’s condition, not about the 
president's performance. 
In Table 3, we show that this pattern holds more generally. To do so, we estimate a 
regression similar to the retrospective voting model in Table 2, but now with our participants’ 
ratings of the 17 historical economies as the dependent variable (instead of incumbent party vote 
margin). That is, to determine the influence that each year had on participants’ economic 
                                                 
9
 Please see the SI , as well as Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz (2012), for additional details on 
Mechanical Turk as well as our samples. 
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evaluations, we regress participants' average ratings of these economies on the percentage 
change in income growth in each of the four years (so the N is 17, not 232).
10
 As shown in the 
first column, participants did indeed overweigh the last year, putting an estimated weight of 0.81 
on Year 4 growth, compared to -0.13, 0.16, and 0.49, for Years 1, 2, and 3, respectively.  
Even though we presented the data from the historical record without presidents’ names, 
participants’ evaluations responded to these economies much as real-world election results did. 
To illustrate this similarity, we recoded both the incumbent party’s actual vote margin in these 17 
elections (the dependent variable (DV) in column 1 of Table 2) and our economic evaluations 
variable (the DV in column 1 of Table 3) to vary from 0 to 1. Then we regressed each of these 
rescaled variables on income growth in the four years of presidents' terms. The results indicate 
that real-world voters and our experimental participants weighed each year of economic growth 
similarly, even though voters experienced actual income growth, while our respondents only saw 
it on their computer screens. The point estimates suggest that our experimental participants may 
put somewhat more weight on Years 2 and 3 than did real-world voters, but the point estimates 
for Years 1 and 4 are nearly the same. To illustrate this correspondence visually, Figure 3 plots 
the incumbent party's actual vote share margin from 1944-2008 against the average rating of the 
economy by our experimental participants, showing that our participants’ ratings predict the 
                                                 
10
 We also estimated specifications in which our dependent variable was the individual 
evaluation, rather than the average across all of the subjects. With or without subjects fixed 
effects, we obtain similar results for the coefficients for each of the years. We focus on the 
results obtained by averaging across subjects because it leads to the most conservative statistical 
inference. 
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actual election results with remarkable accuracy. This similarity in responses supports the 
external validity of the experimental results. 
Since we use historical data for Study B1, a potential concern is that fourth-year income 
growth may follow a unique pattern that could drive these findings.
11
 To address this concern, 
we ran a replication study (Study B2) where 209 participants observed growth rates that, rather 
than drawing from the historical record, we drew at random from a normal distribution that 
reflects the income growth rates prevailing in the postwar period (mean growth equal to two with 
a standard deviation also equal to two). We randomly selected 25 four-year terms in this way. 
Again, we found that participants put extra weight on Year 4. The last column of Table 3 
presents the results. Participants put roughly 2.4 times more weight on Year 4 than Year 3 (p = 
0.03) and 3.1 times more weight on Year 4 than Year 2 (p = 0.04). In the SI, we report additional 
replications, including a replication of the historical data experiment (see p. 13), a replication 
with income-growth bars shown horizontally instead of vertically with the most recent year on 
top (to rule out a simple visual explanation, see pp. 14-15), several replications with hypothetical 
data (see p. 16), and finally one where we relabeled the plots as describing the murder rate under 
governors (see p. 16). In all the studies, we find the same pattern of overweighing later years, 
especially the last year. 
Altogether, the results indicate that, even when people observe information from all four 
years of presidents' terms displayed in an equally salient way, they continue to assign extra 
weight to conditions in the most recent year. They even appear to behave similarly to real-world 
                                                 
11
 Fourth-year income growth does appear somewhat unusual, correlating less strongly with 
other years in the term than those other years correlate with each other (see p. 27 of the SI). 
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voters. The results therefore imply that memory—mainly the absence of memory—cannot 
explain most of voters’ focus on economic conditions at the end of presidents’ terms, even 
though it may still play some role for real-world voters who lack the information that our 
participants observed. Our findings suggest that voters would continue to focus on the end even 
if they knew income growth in all four years.  
Do Voters Think the Election-Year Economy is More Informative? 
If it is not memory, do voters put extra weight on the election-year economy because they 
see it as being more informative about incumbent performance or future growth? As discussed 
earlier, voters may perceive election-year economic conditions as more informative about 
incumbents' ability to manage the economy, and so more predictive about future growth under 
that incumbent (Mackuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2000; 
Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002).12 Voters may think along these lines especially with 
first-term presidents, whose policies may take time to influence the economy.  
                                                 
12
 While voters could perceive the election-year economy to be a better predictor of future 
growth than conditions in earlier years, actual election-year RDI growth does not predict future 
RDI growth particularly well. We present evidence on this point in the SI but stronger evidence 
comes from Achen and Bartels’ (2004) finding that those incumbents whom voters reelect, who 
generally presided over strong election-year economies, did not produce higher levels of post-
election GDP growth than would have been produced by those incumbents who voters did not 
reelect. Using a different specification, Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal (1993, 20) reach a 
similar conclusion.  
 17 
Several findings we have already presented are inconsistent with this explanation. First, 
citizens’ stated intentions to put similar weights on all four years suggest that they do not 
perceive the election-year economy to be more informative than conditions in earlier years. 
Second, the experiments described above asked not for prospective judgments or evaluations of 
incumbents' performance, but only for evaluations of economic conditions during the terms (the 
murder rate study asked about performance, with the results essentially unchanged). Third, in the 
experiments described in the previous section (Studies B1 and B2), we told participants that the 
income growth data were from the incumbents’ second terms.
13
 We did so precisely to address 
the concern about first-term presidents' policies taking time to influence the economy. As a 
result, seeing later years in these experiments as more informative about incumbent quality 
seems especially unlikely. Participants would have to believe that year eight of an incumbent's 
term is considerably more informative about the incumbent’s quality than, say, year six. 
To further assess whether voters perceive the election-year economy to be particularly 
informative, we conducted additional surveys and experiments. As a starting place, we first 
investigated whether participants saw income growth from particular years as more informative 
about income growth in future years (Study C1). After 232 participants rated 17 real-world 
economies for the experiment we presented earlier (Study B1), we asked, “Say you were trying 
to forecast the average economy in the four years following these periods. Would all years 
                                                 
13
 To check whether participants read and remembered these instructions, we asked them at the 
end of a replication study (see page 13 in the SI) whether these hypothetical presidents were in 
their first terms, second terms, or third terms. Of the 64 respondents in the replication study, only 
one answered this incorrectly. The results are identical when we exclude this individual. 
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during these terms be equally predictive of the future? Would later years matter a little more or a 
little less than earlier years? Tell us what you think by assigning percentage weights to each 
year.” Based on their responses, participants did not appear to see later years as considerably 
more informative: the average weights they reported are 19.8%, 22.8%, 26.5%, and 30.9%, 
respectively (see p. 17 of the SI for details). Although this study's 232-sample is not a random 
sample, the answers that respondents gave are similar to the overall weights for related questions 
in both the nationally representative sample and the other online samples reported above.  
As with our studies on voters’ intended weights, we conducted several studies to address 
potential concerns and alternative explanations for this result, but always found a similar result. 
The SI presents the details. First, we replicated this study with a different sample (see p. 18). 
Second, we asked a sample of 257 participants how a hypothetical income growth change in a 
given year would affect their projections of future growth, randomizing whether respondents 
observed a year 1, 2, 3, or 4 growth increase (see p. 19). Third, in a nationally representative 
sample with 987 participants, we asked participants during the 2012 election year a 
straightforward question about how important economic conditions were for predicting growth 
over the next four years, randomly assigning respondents to respond to increased growth either 
“this year,” “last year,” “two years ago,” or “three years ago” (see p. 20). In a fourth study, we 
elicited the valuation that subjects put on the growth rate for a given year by asking them to 
predict future growth after being given the opportunity to obtain information (see p. 21). These 
latter three studies used between-subject designs where participants evaluated a single year, so 
participants were unaware of our interest in how people weigh years relative to each other. 
Across the range of question wordings and samples, we find that people do not see the election 
year as being much more predictive than earlier years in the term. 
As we noted above, the studies where we show participants information on all four years 
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of presidents’ terms also seem inconsistent with people seeing later years as more informative. 
They seem inconsistent because we asked participants to rate the economies themselves, not the 
president's handling of the economy, so participants should not have been considering policy 
lags. A concern with those studies, however, is that the language likely raised the salience of 
politics, potentially leading participants to answer the economic-conditions question as if it was 
about a president’s handling of the economy. If people perceive the election-year economy to be 
more informative about presidential performance, they then could have conceivably put extra 
weight on the election-year economy even though we asked them to evaluate the economy’s 
performance. To address this concern, we conducted another experiment where we again showed 
participants four-year economies with randomly-drawn income growth data, but this time we 
eliminated all mention of presidents or politics from the recruitment language and from the 
experiment itself (Study C2). (See p. 22 of the SI for an example of the plots that participants 
observed.) The findings in this experiment did not change. Column 1 of Table 4 presents the 
regression weights, showing that participants continued to overweigh later years. 
We also conducted another experiment designed to make it particularly implausible that 
the final period could be more informative (Study C3). We randomly assigned participants to see 
two versions of the 25 hypothetical income growth plots. In the “four-year” condition, 
respondents saw plots just like those shown above, except we told them that the plots showed 
yearly income growth in a state for a hypothetical governor’s term, instead of a hypothetical 
president’s term. In the “four-term” condition, we told participants that the plots showed the 
average income growth in each term for governors with especially long tenures: four terms, with 
each term consisting of four years. We kept the plots identical except we retitled them and 
relabeled the four income growth bars, not as Years 1-4, but as Terms 1-4. Figure 4 shows an 
example. If voters simply viewed the last year of a term as more informative, the tendency to 
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give extra weight to later data points should diminish in this condition due to the long period 
covered by four gubernatorial terms. In fact, however, participants continued to put substantially 
more weight on growth in the last period. Table 4 presents the regression coefficients for these 
two conditions. The pattern of weights is largely the same whether participants are evaluating 
four years (Column 2) or four terms (Column 3). 
Finally, we considered the possibility that participants’ behavior could arise due to a 
perception that peaks or trends are particularly informative about economic performance. As we 
noted earlier, psychology studies have found that peaks (or troughs) and trends can influence 
retrospective judgments, though they appear to do so less often than do conditions at the end.
14
 
To investigate whether peaks or troughs could account for the weight participants put on the 
election year, we pooled data from five hypothetical yearly income growth studies (e.g., B2 and 
replication studies). We found little sign that years with the most or the least income growth 
(peaks or troughs) influenced evaluations. On the other hand, we did find some evidence that 
trends matter, especially downward trends, but controlling for trends left our main findings 
unchanged. That is, trends do not account for participants’ tendency to focus on Year 4 growth. 
Please see the SI for the analysis (pp. 23-24). 
Aligning Voters’ Actions with Their Intentions 
The previous three sections presented an array of evidence inconsistent with the memory 
and informativeness explanations for voters’ emphasis on the election-year economy. In contrast, 
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 For example, Carmon and Kahneman (1996) found that respondents only applied an end rule 
when retrospectively evaluating experiences of waiting in line (Kahneman 2000). 
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the end-heuristic explanation can account for the findings. In this section, we directly test a key 
end-heuristic prediction—one that the other explanations do not predict. If voters are 
inadvertently applying an end heuristic—substituting economic growth at the end for economic 
conditions throughout the term—then curing this tendency should be straightforward. We should 
only have to make the attribute people say they are searching for, something approaching total 
growth, readily available, and people will apply the decision rule they say they intend to 
implement. 
To test this prediction, we conducted several experiments. The first had two conditions 
(Study D1). In the control condition, participants saw yearly growth plots just like those 
described in the earlier experiments. In the treatment condition, participants saw both yearly 
growth and cumulative growth (one on top of the other). Figure 5 (top) presents an example. The 
cumulative growth plot simply adds up the current and prior year growth.
15
 The figure makes 
cumulative growth readily accessible but also allows participants to choose between yearly 
growth and cumulative growth.
16
 In the instructions for the study, we provided a brief 
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 We calculate yearly growth and cumulative growth with natural logs, i.e., yearly percent 
change = ln(RDIt) – ln(RDIt-1). This method converts gains and losses to an equivalent scale and 
means that cumulative change can be calculated by adding up the yearly percent change from 
each year.  
16
 In a pilot study, we showed one group just the cumulative plots and the results were essentially 
the same. However, we were concerned about participants potentially misinterpreting the 
cumulative growth bars as referring to yearly growth. By showing participants both, the 
experiment forced them to choose, making misunderstanding less of a concern. 
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explanation of how cumulative growth relates to yearly growth, an explanation that accompanied 
each cumulative plot.
17
 The study had 25 terms and used simulated data as described for the 
earlier studies. 
When yearly growth and cumulative growth are equally available, do people focus on 
cumulative growth? In other words, do they no longer put extra weight on the change in income 
occurring in Year 4? Table 5 shows estimates of the weights given to each year’s income growth 
for both conditions. When participants saw the standard plot, the end mattered more, as in the 
studies above. When participants saw both the yearly and cumulative plots, however, they gave 
roughly equal weight to each year. The weights change from 0.12, 0.37, 0.46, and 0.59, for years 
1-4 respectively, to 0.44, 0.50, 0.54, and 0.50. The ratio of the weight participants place on the 
fourth year relative to the first decreases substantially, from 4.92 to 1.11 (p < 0.01).
18
 When we 
give participants equal access both to cumulative growth and to yearly growth, they therefore 
rely on the attribute—cumulative growth—that is more informative about overall performance.
19
 
One potential concern with presenting data in this format is that people may not think in 
cumulative percentage terms. Another, more intuitive way to make overall economic 
                                                 
17
 After rating all the terms, we tested participants’ understanding of cumulative growth by 
asking them a simple question that involves calculating cumulative growth from yearly growth. 
Ninety percent of the participants answered correctly.  
18
 This test is based on results from individual-level regressions. 
19
 Moreover, we can reject the hypothesis that people weigh economic conditions in line with 
their intentions when they only see growth information (p < 0.001), but not when they see both 
growth and cumulative information (p = 0.156). See p. 28 of the SI for details on these tests. 
 23 
performance easily available is simply to show the level of per-capita income in each of the four 
years. For example, participants could see that per-capita income was $32,500 in the first year, 
$34,000 in the second, etc. By comparing the fourth year to the first year, participants can easily 
see the cumulative growth that occurred. 
To determine whether presenting income in levels would also eliminate end bias, we 
conducted another experiment (Study D2). We randomly assigned participants to see yearly-
growth plots or plots that showed both yearly growth and income in levels. Figure 5 (bottom) 
presents an example of these plots.
20
 We drew the initial value (the Year 1 per-capita income 
level) from a normal distribution with a mean of $32,000 (the average per-capita RDI since 
2000) and a standard deviation of 100. One issue with the level plots is that respondents cannot 
observe growth for the first year. For them to see first year growth, we would have to show them 
per capita income from the last year of the previous administration. As a result, we estimate the 
weights that participants assign to the growth rates that occur in each of the preceding three 
years, as opposed to four years.
21
 
As with the cumulative plots, the level plots also appear to reduce the extra weight voters 
assign to the election-year economy. Column 3 of Table 5 shows the weights for the control 
condition (growth only) and column 4 does so for the level condition, using the identical 
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 Consistent with the cumulative condition, the results refer to subjects who observed growth 
data on top and level data on the bottom. We also ran a condition with the level data on top. In 
this condition, subjects put slightly, but not significantly, more weight on later years. 
21
 If we include year 1 growth in the regression, it enters with a near-zero coefficient and the 
other coefficients remain nearly unchanged. 
 24 
underlying data. Although we cannot compare the first year, the ratio of the weight participants 
place on the fourth year relative to the second decreases substantially, from 2.04 to 1.40 (p = 
0.02).
22
 These results suggest that simply showing voters income in levels, in addition to growth, 
can reduce the extra weight that people put on the election-year economy.  
To address potential concerns with these studies, we conducted six replications. One 
concern is that the sentence explaining cumulative growth that we added to the standard 
instructions from Study B1 could have led participants to privilege cumulative growth over 
yearly growth—though the condition with income in levels lacked any additional instructions 
and produced similar weights for all years. Another concern is that we asked participants not 
about presidential performance, but about the economy during the term, which could push people 
towards weighing all years equally in the cumulative and in the level conditions—though it 
obviously did not do so in the yearly growth conditions from the previous section. To address 
these concerns, we replicated the cumulative study twice. In the first, we explained yearly 
growth with equal detail as cumulative growth (see p. 29). In the second, we did not explain 
cumulative growth in any detail (i.e., identical instructions as in the conditions with only yearly 
growth, see p. 30). In both replications, we also asked about the president’s performance on the 
economy rather than the economy itself.
23
 We likewise replicated the level experiment with the 
president’s performance question (see pp. 31-32). We also worried that the steadier upward trend 
often seen in level or cumulative growth plots could explain people’s responses, so we replicated 
the results showing participants growth and level information in text form rather than in graph 
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 This test is based on results from individual-level regressions. 
23
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing these concerns to our attention. 
 25 
form (see p. 33). Finally, we replicated these findings in a nationally representative internet 
sample that observed only a single term, a between-subject design (see pp. 34-35).
 
Across all 
these studies, the primary results remain the same.  
Our potential cures for myopic voting—presenting cumulative growth or income in 
levels—are in keeping with other research on reducing an end heuristic’s impact on retrospective 
evaluations. For example, Liersch and McKenzie (2009) showed participants pain sequences 
supposedly experienced by others and had them retrospectively assess the overall pain 
experienced. Consistent with our studies, they also found that the end heuristic no longer 
dominated evaluations when they presented participants with plots of cumulative pain.  
Taken together, the findings in this section provide further evidence for the end-heuristic 
explanation. Voters appear to want to evaluate the economy as a whole, not just the end. 
However, since the whole is not readily available to them—it requires adding up growth across 
years—they substitute the end. When people observe cumulative growth or income in levels so 
that the whole is equally available, they no longer make this substitution. Instead, they evaluate 
the economy as they intend to, focusing more on overall growth. In contrast to the alternative 
hypotheses described earlier, only the end-heuristic hypothesis predicts this pattern. 
Conclusions  
Voters’ tendency to focus on election-year performance has substantial consequences for 
policy and election outcomes. It will lead elections to favor the best manipulators as opposed to 
the best stewards of overall economic prosperity. In addition, it incentivizes incumbents to take 
action to inflate election-year growth even at the cost of larger long-term economic damage. 
Such election-year machinations have led to post-election inflation and recession in countries 
ranging from the U.S. to Mexico (Greider 1989; Drazen 2001; Gonzalez 2002; Rogoff 2004). 
 26 
Also, since even the best manipulators have limited control over short-term economic conditions, 
voters’ extra weight on the election-year economy may turn elections into a game of "musical 
chairs," with voters judging incumbents on whether the business cycle happens to be up or down 
in the election year (Achen and Bartels 2004). 
The studies presented in this paper help us understand the underlying causes and potential 
solutions to this phenomenon. Instead of limited voter memory or voters perceiving the election-
year economy as particularly informative, our findings support a simple explanation based on 
research in psychology. Voters appear to judge incumbents on the election-year economy 
because conditions at the end are an easily available attribute that they can substitute for the 
entire experience—in lieu of engaging in the more complicated task of evaluating the whole 
period. Previous research suggests that people inadvertently engage in this kind of attribute 
substitution for precisely these kinds of retrospective assessments, whether for colonoscopies or 
economic evaluations, that require summing up a series of previous experiences. Our results are 
thus consistent with the finding that, when making quick intuitive judgments, “people take their 
heuristics off-the-shelf, use them unknowingly and automatically, and rarely worry about their 
accuracy” (Kuklinski and Quirk 2000), a pattern that holds not only for amateurs, but also for 
experts such as statisticians making quick judgments (Tversky and Kahneman 1971). 
On one hand, our results are discouraging. They imply that the high weight voters assign 
to the election-year economy does not reflect an intentional decision, such as one based on the 
belief that election-year growth is more informative or does a better job of forecasting the future. 
They also imply that the end heuristic should influence decisions across other domains of 




 In addition to holding for different offices, term lengths, visual 
presentations, and question wording, our findings also remained essentially the same when 
participants observed plots referring to crime rather than the economy. 
On the other hand, the end-heuristic explanation implies a simple fix. Since voters do not 
intend to overweigh the election year, they should correct the bias when overall growth is easily 
available. This is precisely what we found. While voters are not likely to observe the plots that 
our respondents saw, our results indicate that relatively simple changes in the information 
context may enable voters to hold their leaders accountable more effectively. Even without the 
graphs, simply focusing on cumulative growth or income in levels in economic news and 
discussions may be enough to change voter behavior. Government departments, the news media, 
or even candidates thus may be able to reduce voters’ unintentional shortsightedness by changing 
how they frame economic data. 
Of course, curing this tendency in the real world may be much more difficult than in the 
lab. For one, representing the complicated process of retrospective voting is difficult with any lab 
studies, even with the variety of conditions we presented in the paper. In addition, the immediacy 
of the current economy and voters’ limited incentives to learn about politics (Downs 1957) are 
formidable barriers. Nevertheless, understanding that voters’ focus on the election-year economy 
reflects a cognitive bias not only provides a fuller picture of the retrospective voter, but also 
makes it possible to test potential solutions that could improve democratic accountability.  
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 For example, Bechtel and Hainmueller (2011) reference the “peak-and-end” heuristic to 
explain voters’ reactions to government disaster response before elections, an interpretation that 
our results support. 
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Descriptions of Surveys and Experiments
Motivation Description N
1. Survey about how much weight voters intend to place on 
the economy in each year of presidential terms
1602
2. Experiment where we elicited weights without directly 
asking participants about weights
572
1. Experiment showing participants income growth from 
the historical record for presidents
232
2. Experiment showing participants hypothetical (randomly 
drawn) income growth for presidents 
209
1. Survey about how predictive each year of the term is for 
future income growth (same sample as B1)
232
2. Experiment showing participants hypothetical income 
growth for four-year periods, but with no mention of 
politics, presidents, terms, etc.
81
3. Experiment where participants saw either four years or 
four terms of income growth under governors (growth 
randomly drawn)
139
1. Experiment where participants saw either yearly income 
growth or both cumulative and yearly growth for the same 
underlying data
116
2. Experiment where participants saw either yearly growth 
or both income in levels and yearly growth for the same 
underlying data
187
A. Elicit intended weights
Notes: We conducted these studies between March 2010 and July 2012. Study A1 was a nationally 
representative sample (on demographics) collected by Survey Sampling International in May 2010. The other 
studies listed here use Mechanical Turk samples. We also conducted numerous replication studies and several 
pilot studies, some of which used student subjects. We report these in the Supporting Information.
B. Test explanations based 
on memory and salience
C. Test explanations 
based on the end 
potentially being more 
informative
D. Test end heuristic 
explanation by looking for 
ways to eliminate the 
election-year emphasis  
Table 2:
Regression estimates for 
actual vote share     
(1944-2008)
Regression estimates 





Year 1 Growth -0.032 0% 20.6%
(0.70) (0.3%)
Year 2 Growth -0.43 0% 22.9%
(0.70) (0.2%)
Year 3 Growth 1.48 25% 27.0%
(0.94) (0.3%)
Year 4 Growth 4.37 75% 29.6%
(1.07) (0.4%)
R-squared 0.64
Number of terms 17
Number of participants 1602
Study A1
Notes: The question asked in column 3 was: “When evaluating the economy during presidents' terms, how much 
weight do you typically give to each year? (Please enter a percent for each year, with the total equaling 100%.)” 
Respondents’ answers were constrained to sum to 100%. Standard errors are in parentheses (unstandardized 
coefficients). The constant is not shown.
Actual weights from presidential elections
Actual and Intended Weights for Income Growth
Intended weights
Table 3:







(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year 1 Growth -0.13 -0.0009 -0.020 -0.13
(0.061) (0.021) (0.0098) (0.12)
Year 2 Growth 0.16 -0.013 0.026 0.21
(0.061) (0.021) (0.0098) (0.13)
Year 3 Growth 0.49 0.044 0.080 0.27
(0.081) (0.028) (0.013) (0.11)
Year 4 Growth 0.81 0.13 0.13 0.66
(0.093) (0.032) (0.015) (0.15)
R-squared 0.92 0.64 0.92 0.66
Number of terms 17 17 17 25
Number of participants 232 232 209
p -values: Comparing Year 4 weight to
    Year 1 weight <0.001 <0.001
    Year 2 weight <0.001 0.037
    Year 3 weight 0.030 0.030
Study B1 B1 B2










Robustness Checks: Weights for Hypothetical Growth Data
 Evaluated over 
four years




Year 1 Growth 0.22 0.11 0.18
(0.062) (0.080) (0.070)
Year 2 Growth 0.43 0.26 0.33
(0.055) (0.073) (0.070)
Year 3 Growth 0.49 0.40 0.47
(0.064) (0.10) (0.10)
Year 4 Growth 0.72 0.69 0.64
(0.058) (0.066) (0.067)
R-squared 0.93 0.93 0.89
Number of terms 25 25 25
Number of participants 81 65 74
p -values: Comparing Year 4 weight to
    Year 1 weight <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
    Year 2 weight 0.003 <0.001 <0.001
    Year 3 weight 0.010 0.027 0.181
Study C2












Income in levels 
and yearly growth
DV:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year 1 Growth 0.12 0.44 0.19
(0.060) (0.063) (0.065)
Year 2 Growth 0.37 0.50 0.31 0.39
(0.053) (0.056) (0.059) (0.053)
Year 3 Growth 0.46 0.54 0.40 0.47
(0.058) (0.061) (0.066) (0.065)
Year 4 Growth 0.59 0.50 0.63 0.52
(0.040) (0.042) (0.055) (0.054)
R-squared 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.90
Number of terms 25 25 25 25
Number of participants 54 62 97 90
p -values: Comparing Year 4 weight to
    Year 1 weight <0.001 0.412 <0.001
    Year 2 weight 0.004 0.968 <0.001 0.012
    Year 3 weight 0.051 0.504 0.004 0.507
Study
Cumulative growth experiment Income-in-levels experiment
Notes: Regression standard errors are in parentheses (unstandardized coefficients). The constants are not shown.
Participants' Economic Evaluations
D1 D2
Figure 1: Election-year Growth and Incumbent Party Vote Share
Figure 2: Examples of Two Plots Shown to Participants in Study B1
Figure 3: Participants' Evaluations of Actual Growth Predict Incumbent Party Vote Share
Note: This figure plots the incumbent party's presidential vote share margin from 1944-2008 against the 
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Four-year economic evaluations (avg.)
Figure 4: Example of Four-Term Growth Plot for Governors
Figure 5 (bottom): Example of Income-in-Levels Plots for Study D2
Figure 5 (top): Example of Cumulative Growth Plots for Study D1 
